September 11th, its Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan
Travel Report, Clement John, International Relations
5 February 2002
| I was in Pakistan from 20-30 January 2002 and travelled through to Lahore, Islamabad and Raiwind in Punjab, Peshawar in Northwest Frontier Province and Karachi in Sind. The visit was to have taken place last October in the aftermath of the massacre of Christians at the Church in Bhawalpur, but was postponed because of uncertainty of international flights to and from Pakistan. As it turned out, the visit was quite timely and provided me an opportunity to understand firsthand, through meetings with Church leaders, politicians, Islamic scholars, academics, journalists, lawyers and human right activists, the recent political developments in the country and their impact on the region particularly in relation to Afghanistan and India.
Government Curbs on Islamic Militancy The general public, who were fed up with the militancy and sectarian killings of Shias and Sunnies by Islamic extremist groups, welcomed the steps taken by the President. Following this announcement came the regime's proclamation to restore the joint electorate system in the country. The Churches and Christians in Pakistan applauded this decision. It will be recalled in the early 1970s, General Zia at the behest of Islamic parties introduced the system of Separate Electorate for the religious minorities. According to this System, religious minorities could only vote for candidates of their own community for a few reserved seats in the Provincial and National Assemblies. They could not vote for Muslim candidates in general elections. The System based on the Islamic concept of "Zimmis" (second class citizens) segregated and discriminated against the religious minorities. It effectively cut them off from the mainstream of national life. The Churches, Christians and progressive Muslim organisations like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan had waged a long struggle against this System that came to be known as "electoral apartheid". Every one, except the religious parties and groups have welcomed the decisions made by President Musharraf. However, some circles are apprehensive that these have been made under pressure from the US. There appears to be no real change of heart within the military circles, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), responsible for promoting the policy of exporting Islamic militancy not only in Afghanistan and Kashmir but also, encouraging it in countries of Central Asia, China and Russia. The question being raised is will the Islamists in the military allow President Musharraf the time and the space to implement the policy changes that have been made and are bound to have a long-term impact on the country's polity? The President is on weak grounds since he is not an elected representative of the people. Some political parties have raised legal questions in the courts regarding his authority to introduce such changes. President Musharraf presently has the backing of the armed forces; however, there are reports of attempts by rogue officials in the ISI, who are not happy with the new trend, to sabotage his actions. It is said that the December 13th attack on the Indian parliament in Delhi was instigated by the ISI through the Jihadi groups - Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lakshar-e-Taiba to embarrass the President. Both these organisations have now been banned and their assets seized. The section of the ISI dealing with political affairs has been disbanded. The disgruntled officials in the military and members of religious groups have openly accused President Musharraf of being a traitor to the cause of Kashmir and for the steps he has taken against Islamic parties and groups. Convincing the ISI to disengage itself from the Jihadi groups that were nurtured over the years will be General Musharraf's toughest task. The task is complicated by the number of officers in the army that are committed to a Pan-Islamic agenda and see the ISI as an instrument for its realisation. Unless steps are taken to restore the role of the foreign office in determining the country's national security policy, ISI will remain a problem at the institutional level. This could well undermine the new direction the regime is trying to set to make Pakistan society more open, tolerant and progressive. In implementing the new policy changes President Musharraf needs to assure the public that the Kashmir cause has not been sold down the line. The Kashmir issue has an emotional hold over the people of Pakistan and is an important factor in the growth of Islamic militancy in the region. Thousands of Pakistanis including many young men are prepared for martyrdom to liberate Kashmir. Contrary to the general belief, young people at the core of jihadi groups come not only from the poorer rural areas for economic reasons but also have in their ranks an increasing number of educated young men from middle and upper class families from urban areas. They have volunteered to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir. According to the local press over two thousand young men went to Afghanistan with Sufi Mohammed of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammedi (TNSM), a party committed to the enforcement of Shariah Laws in Pakistan, to fight the US forces. Out of the total nearly 1100 volunteers are unaccounted for - either killed or imprisoned. In addition a large number of Pakistani volunteers were either killed or captured at three front lines - Mazar-e-Sharif, TakharKunduz and Kabul. The law enforcement agencies foresee a rise in sectarian militancy as some of the fighters who have gone underground head back home from Afghanistan. According to police officials, the return of highly trained veterans of the Afghan war will boost the morale of extremist groups and may become a nightmare for law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, the government has stepped up surveillance along the Pak-Afghan border. However, because the borders are long and porous, fighters can easily slip in despite the dragnet that has been put in place by Pakistan Security Forces. In view of the ongoing drive of the military regime, religious parties and groups are getting together to map out a common strategy to recover the ground they lost since General Musharraf's reversal of the Afghanistan policy on September 19th. The parties have come together on two major joint platforms - Afghan Defence Council and United Action Front to wage a struggle against government polices that are seen as promoting US interests. Their main grievance is the government's decision to intervene and bring under control the Madarassah system. The monitoring system devised for this purpose includes bringing seminaries into the mainstream education system, modernising the syllabi, putting an end to sectarian leanings and keeping check on student enrolment. Entries of foreign students are to be recorded and made subject to government regulations. The religious parties and groups have called on their followers to defy the ban on use of loudspeakers, not to open their books and accounts to government scrutiny and to prevent interference in the Madarrasah system. They are also strategising to begin public awareness campaign that includes holding seminars, putting out advertisements and informing the public of the real intentions of the military regime. The parties have also taken legal recourse for the release of its leaders. If these democratic methods fail to generate enough pressure on the government the United Action Front plans to launch a countrywide anti-government movement. Since the government appears to be in no mood to relent and change its policies, one can foresee a tense struggle developing ahead between the regime and the religious parties. Indo-Pak Tensions My visit took me to border areas and the major garrison towns in Punjab and Frontier Province where I witnessed war preparedness at every nook and corner. Military installations were camouflaged, reservists had been called up, leaves of military personnel cancelled and civil defence forces were undergoing training to come to the aid of civilian population in the event of a war. Anti-Indian feelings ran high amongst the people. Most people I met accused India of taking advantage of the US war on terrorism to settle scores with Pakistan. India is trying to capitalise on the current international climate to crush the freedom struggle in Kashmir. It refuses to have dialogue with Pakistan or international mediation, but is putting pressure on the government to curb its militancy in Kashmir. The Pakistan regime is in no position to comply with this demand because of the emotional hold Kashmir has on the psyche of the Pakistan people. Given the circumstances it is difficult to see the lessening of tension between India and Pakistan in the foreseeable future. Change in Christian-Muslim Relations On the surface this new development of inter-religious cooperation seems encouraging. Some members of the Christian community are however sceptical. They are of the view these initiatives are taken because presently the Muslims find themselves isolated and stigmatised by the West. These initiatives therefore are an attempt to show to the world that Pakistan is an open society that accepts diversity and believes in pluralism. Be that as it may, most church leaders have welcomed this new opportunity and are joining hands with the majority community in order to build a healthy relationship and call for peace and an end to war in Afghanistan. Some members of the community in Karachi told me that when the bombing in Afghanistan began Christians living in the vicinity of the Churches left their homes to seek shelter with Muslim friends because of the fear that Churches and Christian homes would be the subject of attack by religious parties and groups. The Christian community while appreciating the measures taken by President Musharraf remains apprehensive and uncertain. It lives in fear of a backlash from the Islamic extremist groups who are not happy with the recent developments. Christians also fear that if President Musharraf is forced out of office by the army there maybe a reversal of his policies. Members of the community worry that the situation may take a turn for the worse if the US forces prolong their stay in the country. Unlike as in the past when there was great love and admiration for the US there is now fear and distrust of its presence. Prospects of Peace and Security in Afghanistan The large influx of refugees into Pakistan that was predicted when the US began its military campaign in Afghanistan did not materialise. Only around 70,000 came and were held at the Jollazai camp, also known as the camp of death because of its remoteness and inhospitable environment. The camp is located in no-man's land between the Pak-Afghan borders. Some refugees did cross over into Pakistan, but their numbers were minimal. At the time of my visit the government of Pakistan, in view of international media reports about conditions in Jollazai camp, had begun to shift the refugees to camps in Pakistan. Contrary to media reports, refugees were not returning home because of winter and for security reasons. There were a few instances where male members returned to assess the security situation in order to return later with their families. Most of the top leadership of Taleban, including some former ministers, have taken refuge in Pakistan and are staying with relatives and friends. Not all have been handed over to the US Forces. There were stories of general lawlessness and looting of food convoys in Afghanistan. Except for Kabul and its surrounding areas, security remained a matter of grave concern not only for the returning refugees but also for aid organisations wanting to shift their operations to Afghanistan. All the groups in Afghanistan have welcomed the Bonn Accord. It provides for a Special Independent Commission to convene the emergency Loya Jirga (People's Assembly) within six months from 22nd December 2001 when the power was transferred to the present Interim Authority headed by Hamid Karzai. The Loya Jirga shall facilitate a broad based fully representative government elected through free and fair elections. These elections will be held within two years of the convening of the Loya Jirga. A significant feature of the Bonn Accord is its commitment to human rights. It calls on the Interim Authority and the emergency Loya Jirga to act in accordance with the basic principles and provisions contained in "international instruments on human rights and international humanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party". While United Nations efforts to broker peace in Afghanistan are commendable and promise hope for the future, local people who have suffered during the last two decades remain fearful. As an Afghan teacher at the Kacha Gari camp put it: "the more things change, the more they remain the same". Already mistrust and rivalries are beginning to surface amongst disparate groups of warlords and tribal leaders. Throughout Afghanistan's chequered history various tribes and regional communities have operated relatively independent of the central state authority. To strengthen central authority and the hegemonic position of the dominant ethnic group, state officials have often pursued antagonistic and discriminatory policies towards ethnic minorities. This weakness in the state structure of governance was very much evident during the rule of Taleban who belonged to the majority Pashtun tribe. One hopes that history will not repeat itself. The Afghan people who have been thrown from the frying pan into the fire on at least two occasions in the recent past deserve a better deal. They need peace after decades of killing and destruction. Whether this will materialise will depend amongst others on how Afghanistan's immediate neighbours Iran, Pakistan and Russia behave. Will they leave Afghanistan alone? Or will they continue to intervene to carve out their spheres of influence? Much will also depend on US plans now that the first phase of the war is over. Will it deploy troops on a long-term basis? If this happens it will have its consequences not only for Afghanistan but for the region as well. Given the present disarray in the country it is difficult to foresee the Interim Authority or the Loya Jirga raising a national army anytime soon. In this case, will the international community respond positively to Hamid Karzai's request for thirty thousand peacekeepers? From the response received on his recent tour to Europe and the US this seems highly unlikely. In the circumstances how will Afghanistan overcome its present security dilemma? If the security system remains uncertain as it is today what are the prospects for reconstruction and rebuilding? The leadership in Afghanistan faces an uphill task that will not be easy to accomplish unless a miracle occurs. |